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I. Overview and Justification 
In spite of a spike in income from agricultural and mineral commodities in the early 
2000s, Latin American countries have generally faced stagnating incomes and levels of 
productivity in recent years. Moreover, total factor productivity (TFP) has only marginally 
increased in the best of cases, even with some growth in labor and capital (IDB 2014). Figure 1 
shows the regional stagnation in TFP; by contrast, over the same period pictured the advanced 
OECD economies have grown at a steady one percent per year.1 Similarly, by most other 
standard measures of innovation (numbers of patents, for example), Latin American countries are 
global underperformers. Of course, countries in the region typically devote little of their national 
income – generally under half of one percent of GDP – to innovation-oriented activities, such as 
research and development (Figure 2; World Development Indicators). OECD average, by 
contrast, is nearly 2.5 percent.  
Latin American countries have been aware of these trends and, in fact, most of the large 
countries in the region do have a national innovation agency whose goal it is to promote 
innovation, knowledge, and productivity growth. Several of the agencies even date back to the 
1960s. The puzzle is that, in spite of the presence of these agencies, countries in the region 
continue to fall behind their global competitors in terms of investment, productivity, and 
innovation. Why is this the case? What do we know about how effective innovation agencies in 
other parts of the world work? How are the Latin American innovation agencies like or unlike 
their peers in more innovative economies? These are all questions that have not been 
systematically researched. To date, there is no broad comparative study of the regional IAs that 
compares LAC IAs to each other or to the group of globally prominent and IAs, which have 
effected transformation in their own economies. What follows is a general framework for 
documenting and comparing the goals, characteristics, and outcomes associated with existing 
agencies in Latin America and in wealthier countries where IAs have performed well. 
                                               
1 Data from stats.oecd.org. Mean value of .96 percent growth per annum includes AUS, AUT, 
BEL, CAN, CHE, DEU, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, IRL, ITA, JPN, KOR, NLD, NZL, PRT, 
SWE, USA. 
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Fig 1: Total Factor Productivity in LAC, 1992-2014
(1960 = 1)
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II. Innovation Agencies 
 Governments can successfully promote the adoption and generation of innovations in 
domestic industry, and dedicated innovation agencies are a means by which both emerging and 
already wealthy countries have successfully intervened to spur innovation. What specific steps 
an innovation agency takes necessarily depends not only on the characteristics of a country but 
also on the nature of the technologies it seeks to promote and the global structure of related 
industries and their markets. To understand how these IAs have operated, the first point of 
reference is the programs that were put in place allowing for the rapid “catch-up” by the so-
called developmental states in East Asia. These late-developing states, were able to leap forward 
technologically by promoting technology transfer, imitation, and competition by entire industries 
(Amsden 1989, 2001; Johnson 1982; Wade 1990). The catch-up strategy of development was 
enabled by a “specific state structure” that promoted long-term economic planning and the 
engagement of large vertically-integrated conglomerates (Breznitz 2007; 14). This structure – a 
centralized pilot agency – functioned by understanding the long-term needs and lowering the risk 
of conglomerates rapidly adopting existing technologies and competitively entering export 
markets based on scope and scale. Historically, these kinds of pilot agencies have been largely 
served for encouraging catch-up and incremental innovation (Breznitz and Orston 2012).  
It is, however, understood that this kind of particular state structure is unlikely to be 
effective in the current economic and technological environment. In the first place, production 
has been fragmented globally, such that entire supply chains are not necessarily located in the 
same country. Instead, countries increasingly specialize in particular production stages, rather 
than on developing complete supply chains within conglomerates. Second, although there is still 
much growth by imitation to be encouraged, the leading edge of technological innovation has 
begun changing increasingly rapidly. 
 To the extent that innovation agencies are engaged in spurring innovation at the 
technological frontier, the traditional approaches to promoting productivity growth are 
inappropriate. Rapid innovation-based growth at the leading edge of technology development 
require agencies that are structured and operate differently. Wong (2011) distinguishes between 
“risk” and “uncertainty” in technological innovation. Risk refers to situations where there may be 
failure, but the probability of failure is known or calculable; uncertainty denotes situations where 
that probability is unknowable. “Catch-up” development entails risk but little uncertainty 
 5 
because it primarily involves the adoption of existing technologies (or incremental changes), 
while innovation-based growth at the technological frontier includes uncertainty, because 
comparatively little is known about future products or markets for new technologies. Because of 
uncertainty generated by rapid innovation, a distinct kind of flexible agency is necessary to 
support innovation and growth: an experimentalist and co-evolutionary agency (Breznitz 2007). 
Effective innovation agencies in these conditions have been shown 1) to not be the objects of 
political interference because of their low profiles and scarce resources, 2) to develop novel 
instruments that are not “taken” (i.e. used by) other agencies, and 3) to cultivate strong networks 
with complementary but nontraditional organizations because of the agency’s peripheral status 
(Breznitz and Ornston 2012). In the first place, it is important that IAs be guided by technocratic 
understandings of industries’ needs and by objective evaluation of programs rather than by 
political calculations. Political interference by entrenched public or private sector interests 
undermines the capacity of an IA to openly experiment and fairly assess instruments. In the 
second place, without a wealth of resources to draw upon, these peripheral agencies must explore 
alternative instruments for facilitating innovation, creating a basis for culture of ongoing 
experimentation. Finally, because they are outside the primary apparatus of the state and limited 
in resources, they tend to opportunistically build cooperative networks with organizations that 
they could draw upon for ideas and support in the development and deployment of novel 
innovation programs. Critically, these characteristics made these poorly funded agencies in 
Finland and Israel “institutionalized loci of experimentation, pioneering radically new science, 
technology, and innovation policies,” that could be scaled-up in times of need (Breznitz and 
Ornston 2012; 1223). 
In the countries that they have most successfully fostered the rapid innovation based 
industries, innovation policies have helped develop products, processes, services, and industries 
that did not yet exist and whose business models and markets had to be created. Accordingly, 
innovation policy needs to be based on continuous experimentation, not on long-term, static and 
detailed economic planning. In other words, policymakers in innovation agencies must rapidly 
come up with new initiatives, kill those that do not work, scale up those that do, and then, as new 
industries grow, keep adjusting the incentives in a co-evolutionary process to keep pace with a 
target industry’s dynamic needs and capabilities (Breznitz 2007; Breznitz and Ornston 2012). 
There is not one universal design principal for innovation agencies that allows them to be able to 
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accomplish this; instead a variety of factors can encourage or frustrate the ability of an agency to 
flexibly develop policies that address the changing needs of their private sectors. Further, as the 
global fragmentation of production has led some locations to focus on specific stages of 
production in particular industries, economies need a very different set of innovation capacities 
and the institutional systems that supports and stimulates them. 
Is the establishment of effective innovation agencies in Latin America is possible? Latin 
American countries are distinct in many respects from countries in other regions in ways that are 
likely to inhibit the formation of effective IAs. For example, most Latin American countries have 
a strong tendency toward economic dualism, are dominated by conglomerates that seek shelter 
from markets rather than upgrading (Schneider 2013), are socioeconomically more unequal than 
any other region of the world which presents distinct challenges (see Amsden 1992). However, 
there are ample signs that, despite the conditions that might inhibit innovation in Latin America, 
there is hope that IAs may be successful there as well. Many LAC are heavily reliant of the 
exploitation of natural resources (like Finland, where Tekes worked in a traditionally resource-
dependent economy); most have bureaucracies that are qualified as relatively ineffective (like 
Israel, which also suffered from the same fault but had an effective IA with OCS); multinational 
corporations have a major presence in the economies of many Latin American countries (but 
they were used as a source of strength in Ireland); very small firms are predominant (like 
Taiwan, which was characterized by development of small firms). With that in mind, we identify 
some general best practices that are have emerged from the nascent scholarship on IAs.  
 First, a critical feature of effective innovation agencies is that they are experimentalist in 
their modes of operation. An experimentalist orientation is very important to successful IAs 
because their effectiveness derives not from a particular formulaic or standard structure but from 
a willingness and ability to adapt to new economic conditions and be “flexible facilitating 
agents” rather than static and directorial (Breznitz 2007). Experimentalism includes a number of 
features that should be embodied in various operational characteristics of the innovation 
agencies. First, it includes the flexibility to initiate new programs or to adjust old ones as 
necessary in the face of changing economic conditions (Breznitz 2007; Breznitz and Ornston 
2012). This, of course, pairs with the willingness and political capacity to both wind-down 
existing programs that do not advance the agency’s mission and the ability to scale-up effective 
programs that do.  
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 Second, and relatedly, they should be co-evolutionary, which refers to the capacity to 
adapt innovation programs to changing conditions in the private sector. When IAs develop and 
deploy successful programs, the private sector necessarily changes in response. As these changes 
occur, the IA's programs can become obsolete and require either elimination or updating. As 
with experimentalism, this requires IAs to continually assess the programs they deploy in order 
to determine when they have outlived their usefulness or have become less suited to emerging 
conditions in the private sector.  
 Third, being self-evaluative or knowing which programs/policies work as intended is 
central to being able to experiment and enlarge successful programs or kill failing ones. Thus, 
the ability to accurately and objectively assess the effectiveness of a program relative to its goals 
is an absolute necessity.  In short, since much of what innovation agencies do is experimental 
and evolutionary, an important part of the agencies’ learning and self-evaluation processes 
should be to gauge whether programs are effective or not, as well as whether the agency takes 
enough risks in attempting to develop programs. Along with this, they must have the flexibility 
and discretion to be self-correcting (fourth) by adjusting programs based on the results of 
evaluation. 
 Fifth, as the preceding implies, they must be insulated from pressures from both their 
political overseers and from the private sector. First, innovation agencies should view failed 
programs as opportunities to learn; however, failed experiments can be politically difficult for 
appointed officials with short time horizons. The admission of failed programs is understood to 
reflect badly on the Ministers who oversee IAs, even if the closing of a particular program is the 
right decision in terms of agency effectiveness. At the same time, they need autonomy from 
private sector pressures and “capture” as well, which can affect the ability of an agency to make 
decisions to deploy or cut programs. Government programs often create “constituencies” in the 
private sector that desire the continuation of the programs. Cutting ineffective programs that 
benefit powerful private sector actors can thus be politically uncomfortable for IAs. Therefore, 
agencies need a degree of insulation from both political actors with short time horizons and risk 
(failure)-aversion, as well as from private sector actors with vested interests who might have 
personal motives – financial or political – not wholly consistent with the stated mission of the 
agency. 
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Sixth, although they should be insulated from pressure from the private sector, they must 
also have some normalized mechanism for monitoring the private sector in order to tailor 
interventions well and understand industrial developments. Some have framed this as 
“embeddedness” (Evans 1995) or “multiple embeddedness” of state actors within the private 
sector in more network oriented states (O’Riain 2004; Block 2008), but this relationship also 
depends upon the relations between firms in the private industry (Samford 2017). Ultimately, in 
the age of evolutionary innovation agency, the mode of remaining in close contact with the 
private sector may differ and change; without some working conduit to groups of firms, IAs will 
fail.  
Seventh, IAs need to be able to network and draw together interested parties from 
government, private sector, interested domestic and international actors in cooperative networks. 
Following Breznitz and Orston (2012), this is important for both the development of novel 
interventions and for the resources to scale them up if they are found to be effective for 
promoting innovation. A long line of research on organizational networks has found value in 
being able to use network connections for social and material resources. IAs, which are often 
small and resource poor, similarly benefit from those network resources.  
There is not one universal design principal for innovation agencies that allows them to be 
able to promote innovation and technological growth; instead a variety of factors can encourage 
or frustrate the ability of an agency to flexibly develop policies that address the changing needs 
of their private sectors. These seven general characteristics are among the most important that 
have been identified in previous scholarship. However, in spite of these complexities facing the 
design of policies that promote innovation, there is no existing analytical framework enabling a 
systematic analysis of the goals and operation features of IAs; instead, policymakers tend to 
imitate trends that seem to work elsewhere, whether or not they fit local conditions. Therefore, 
this document provides a framework for conducting this comparison, drawing on what we know 
about IAs outside of Latin America.  
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III. Dimensions of Comparison 
The task of developing a comparative study of innovation agencies in Latin America and beyond 
can be broken into two processes, documentation/characterization and evaluation/assessment: 
• The first of these tasks is to identify and characterize the overall mission or broad 
strategy of each agency and to document the operational elements of the 
innovation agencies. 
o What is the innovation context in which the agency is situated?  
o What are stated intentions of the agency?  
o What are the internal operating features of the agency that are intended to 
achieve this goal?  
• The second task is to evaluate the relative effectiveness of the agency within the 
context of the national economy. This should be an assessment with reference to 
both: 1) the intent (or strategy) of the agency in its environment (i.e., what we call 
“external suitability”); 2) how those operational elements of each agency accord, 
or fail to accord, with its goals (i.e., what we call the “internal coherence” of the 
agency), and 3) general indicators of effectiveness, such as increase in innovation 
investment and outputs, the return on public investment, and so forth. 
o Does its mission/strategy situate the IA in a role that is important to the 
functioning of the national innovation system? Or address a historical 
weakness? 
o Are the operational features well-suited to the agency’s mission? 
o  Do the instruments and features of the agency work (vis-à-vis their own 
goals and external measures)? 
Both of these processes are important for developing a systematic comparison of IAs. Because 
agencies have different goals and are structured differently, there is a need to document the 
variation in their characteristics. In other words, it makes little analytical sense to compare across 
agencies without first establishing what their goals are and how they are structured to achieve 
those goals. IAs in other regions display are great deal of variety, and there is no reason to 
assume that in Latin America they are homogenous. Accordingly, the first goal is to be able to 
relate them to one another (and perhaps categorize) based on characteristics and goals.  
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The second vector for comparison is evaluative. First, this should allow for the identification of 
patterns regarding external suitability, internal coherence, and actual performance. Ultimately, 
case comparisons based on this framework should lead to the production of a “playbook guide” 
for innovation policymakers to consult as they tailor innovation policies to their specific context 
and stage of growth; this guide will document the potential agency features, where those might 
function well or not, existing pathologies of matching strategies to context (external suitability) 
and features/instruments to strategies (internal coherence), and how well particular instruments 
function.  
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III.A. Economic and Innovation Setting 
The most basic starting place for a study of innovation agencies is to take stock of the economic 
and political conditions within which each IA operates (and has historically operated). This 
domestic environment includes, for example, the structure of the economy, which can be 
partially captured by the share of different sectors in the domestic economy, the extent to which 
traditionally high-tech industries vs. lower tech industries predominate, and the historical growth 
of productivity. The current and historical nature of the national innovation system and industrial 
development policy are also important contextual elements. National innovation systems (NIS) 
are considered to be the network of institutions and organizations geared toward generation and 
diffusion of technologies (Nelson 1995, CJE). These are considered to consist of academic 
institutions, private enterprises, public sector organizations, and the relationship between these 
organizations. While necessarily treated qualitatively, important indicators of the NIS also 
include expenditures on R&D by business and government and levels of human capital 
development. The existing innovation system and productive profile of the economy are 
obviously important given that those are what IAs typically alter. In situations where an 
economy is heavily-based on low value-added commodities or has historically been low in terms 
of R&D activities, the task of raising the level of the innovation is bound to be more difficult. 
Commodities exporters (e.g., Ecuador) face a distinct set of challenges from economies based on 
light industry and services (e.g., El Salvador); commodity exporters have potential to build 
innovation upon the exploitation of commodities and related products (as CORFO has in Chile), 
while it makes more sense for a service-based economy to pursue a distinct strategy. The same is 
true of countries that have large differences in training and educational attainment. In general, 
given the current state of technology development in Latin America, the IAs there may be more 
focused on the absorption of technologies that are new to their markets or on process innovation 
than they are on inventing technologies at the edge of the technological frontier. 
Because it is inextricably linked to the domestic economy, the global economic 
environment also necessarily shapes how innovation agencies must operate. In particular, the 
nature of the trade regime and the relationship with foreign investors are important in shaping 
competitive forces and international technology flows. For example, the presence of 
multinational investors may provide the opportunity for the transfer and development of 
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capacities to local firms, but only under circumstances that impel multinationals to work with 
local firms. Moreover, countries in Latin America demonstrate high variance in joining of 
preferential trade agreements. For some countries, such as Mexico as a signatory to NAFTA, 
these may have the effect of strongly tying them into trade and investment relationships with 
their partners. In general, given the neoliberal bent of some governments in LAC and the heavy 
reliance on commodity crops and minerals in many others, it is likely that a comparison of 
regional IAs will find them to be less ambitious in their goals than other global IAs. In short, 
understanding the basic economic and policy environment is critical to situating an IA within its 
national innovation system and grasping how the agency is positioned to promote innovation. 
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III.B. Mission and Strategy 
In terms of comparing innovation agencies, it is valuable to consider the overall goals of 
agencies in order to: 
1. Situate them relative to comparable institutions in other countries; 
2. Assess them in terms of whether their operational features are coherently oriented 
toward those goals. 
3. Evaluate them in terms of how well an agency is progressing toward fulfilling its overall 
goals.  
Although there are potentially other meaningful distinctions, we propose two features that on 
often distinguish IAs from one another: first, the extent to which they focus on particular sectors 
(vertical focus) versus being broadly oriented and cross-sectoral (horizontal focus). The second, 
is the extent to which they seek to alter the economy, from simply raising productivity in existing 
firms and sectors on one end, to encouraging a paradigmatic shift aiming to reorient the economy 
on the other. IA missions should be matched with the actual structures and instruments used to 
pursue those goals. 
Horizontally-oriented agencies seek to assist a wide range of industries and services, 
often with interventions that are generalized and can have effects across the economy. Rather 
than pushing the development of a particular industry, they intend to raise the level of a 
particular kind of activity across the economy. For example, The Office of Chief Scientist in 
Israel is a horizontally-oriented agency on maximizing R&D; defined as new product research 
and development activities across the economy. The idea of raising levels of “entrepreneurship” 
skills among potential and actual business people is similarly horizontal.  
Vertically-oriented agencies are those that focus on a specific set of technologies or a 
much narrower range of industries (possibly a related set of industries that supply each other). 
Taiwan’s ITRI, for example, reached success by focusing on ICT and, within them, specifically 
on semiconductors. The distinction between vertical and horizontal in this context is best thought 
of as a tendency rather than as a dichotomous distinction, given that many IAs may have a 
mandate that includes both narrow and broad targeting. The distinction here is important because 
there is a relationship between an agency’s ability to excel at these two different approaches and 
a particular set of operational features, tools, and skills. 
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Second, innovation agencies can be thought of as sitting on a continuum between being 
oriented toward “upgrading” or toward “transformation.” This distinction refers to the degree to 
which the agency aims to alter the existing nature of the economy. On the “upgrading” end of the 
continuum, agencies target existing firms and industries and seek to promote the development or 
adoption of more productive technologies, sometimes with the goal of opening opportunities for 
new industries. Examples include agencies such as Spring (Singapore) and VINNOVA 
(Sweden). We can think of upgrading in several different manners: the absorption of new 
technologies into an existing mature industry (e.g., additive manufacturing for prototyping in 
auto parts suppliers), enabling the same set of activities (e.g., component manufacturing) in new 
industries (for example, biotechnology), or as the development of downstream activities that add 
further value to currently produced goods and services (e.g., processing of fishes in Chile).  
Transformative IAs stimulate the development and growth of industries that are entirely 
new to their countries. While this was accomplished in Taiwan by ITRI’s heavy involvement in 
research and development of ICT, there are other mechanisms by which this transformation 
might be accomplished (shrewd use of foreign investment being one example). Although Latin 
American IAs have yet to be systematically studied, we suspect that it is probably that they will 
tend toward the “upgrading” side of this continuum.  
Within their general mission, agencies have a specific set of strategic objectives that are 
intermediate steps toward their broad goal. Canada’s IRAP, for example, identifies targeting 
SMEs, providing applied/pragmatic research assistance, and collaboration with other research 
organizations as elements of the agency’s approach to the broader mission of accelerating 
business growth. A comparative project should also document these intermediate objectives, 
based on their mission statements or other policy documents. These are important because they 
expose the strategies that the IA intends to pursue, which in turn links the broad mission to the 
operational characteristics of the agency. 
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III.C. Operational Characteristics 
Each innovation agency has a set of operational characteristics, which are the functional means 
by which the agency pursues its innovation goals. We propose that these features can be divided 
into five categories (detailed below): Organization, Governance, Financing, Coordination, and 
Instruments. Beyond the need to document an array of relevant details of these features, there are 
two primary concerns related to the assessment of these operational features.  
First, are these operational features structured in an effective manner to promote the 
broad mandate of the agency? That is, are they “internally coherent” vis-à-vis the mission and 
objections of the agency? There is, after all, no guarantee that the operational features of an 
agency are appropriately designed to meet its goals. For example,  
• A lack of flexibility in governance may hobble the generation of new programs; 
• Certain kinds of incentives may be poorly designed to fit the outcomes desired (for 
example, Canada’s R&D tax credits have grown in the last thirteen years while business 
R&D investment has declined to historic lows); 
• Governance structure without autonomy may curtail the extent to which the agency can 
operate flexibly in response to changing market conditions; 
• The training and experience of staff are not ideal for the kinds of functions they preform 
within the agency.  
There are, in short, many possible mismatches. Assessing the fit between the operational features 
and mission across IAs not only allows for the identification of common mismatches but also 
allows for the highlighting agencies where there is a tight fit between operational features and 
mission. 
The second concern is whether the operational features function effectively, individually 
or as a whole. The Instruments are the most straightforward to assess in terms of their 
effectiveness, but there is enough known about IAs that other elements can be evaluated as well. 
Regarding governance, for example, too little flexibility in the design and implementation of 
innovation programs and instruments is inimical to strong performance. This can be a 
consequence of either heavy-handed oversight or political intervention. Financing need not be 
very generous – and scarce resources have been shown to be desirable for ensuring 
experimentation – but it needs to be reliable and insulated from political manipulation. Poor 
coordination with other organizations – though not all – in the innovation ecosystem is 
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important, given the likelihood of needing to work with other organizations to scale up effective 
programs, to avoid overlap, to draw on the expertise of others (e.g. for particular research needs), 
and so on. Coordination between levels of government is also important for federated countries, 
where subnational governments also have programs of their own (Canadian IRAP, for example, 
has at times struggled to coordinate with initiatives developed at the provincial level). Finally, in 
terms of organization, there are multiple areas of assessment, spanning from whether there are 
appropriate kinds and levels of staff to the balance of discretion with accountability to 
organizational learning. In short, each of operational feature can be evaluated in terms of its 
suitability to the goal of the agency as well as against the features of effective agencies.  
 
III.C.1. Governance 
Governance refers to the manner in which the IA is controlled and directed, as well as the 
relationship between the agency and any supervisory ministries. As stated above, heavy-handed 
oversight and veto control can be inimical to the ability of an IA to be experimentalist and 
flexible. Naturally, an IA must be held accountable for pursuing its mandate, so there must be a 
means of balancing that accountability with the agency discretion. What is the agency’s legal 
status and what, if any, ministries are legally in control of the IA? To what extent is the agency 
autonomous to design its own instruments or to alter its own strategic goals (in either de facto or 
de jure terms)? Flexibility, in particular, is understood as a very important element of IA 
operation; to what extent is this curtailed or facilitated by governance structures? 
 Also included in this feature is the relationship with the private sector. Clearly, the 
agency must not be “captured,” or take actions based only on the private interests of particular 
industries or firms. At the same time that control over decisions is maintained within the agency 
or ministry, the agency needs to retain meaningful ties to the private sector in order to effectively 
design and implement programs and to monitor the technological and economic “horizon.”  
 
III.C.2. Financing 
The nature of their financing is a critical feature of the manner in which innovation agencies are 
able to pursue their organizational ends. We would seek to understand not only the levels and 
sources of funding for the agency, but also such features as its stability (or reliability). While 
sufficient levels of funding are obviously necessary, previous research indicates that more is not 
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necessarily superior in all cases. Smaller, peripheral agencies such as the Israeli OCS, have 
benefitted from limited funding in the sense that they must move efficiently to cut programs that 
are ineffective, and create broad collaboration (and hence sustained networks) in order to scale-
up successful initiatives. In terms of reliability, it is critical for IAs to have funding that is 
reliable both in the sense that it arrives as expected and in the levels expected. Because stability 
and political insulation are important, the mechanisms by which the agency is funded are also 
significant because some forms of financing are more easily altered than others. Are the agency’s 
funds secured by long-term, dedicated budget line or is the mechanism less secure? Finally, 
given that decisions made by the agency may be politically unpalatable – e.g. closing an 
ineffective but popular program or ultimately unsuccessful program experiment – it is important 
for the funding for IAs to hold up in face of political disputes and to be insulated from short-term 
political pressures. In sum, IAs need a reliable funding, that 1) can be mobilized quickly for the 
deployment or scaling-up of a particular program, 2) can be risked on programs with uncertain 
outcomes, 3) is not so large as to make the agency a target of political or business manipulation, 
4) is not generous enough to allow the agency to keep failed experiment alive, and, 5) require 
collaboration with other actors in order to scale up efforts. 
 
III.C.3. Coordination 
Coordination refers to the nature of the connection of the IA in question to the broader national 
innovation system in which it is embedded and the extent to which the agency is able to work 
cooperatively with other organizations. Of particular interest are: 1) the relationship to other 
development ministries or agencies with shared interests in innovation, and 2) the relationship 
with the private sector. In the first place, it is ideal that the IA have a working relationship with 
other ministries, agencies, and organizations both at the national and local levels. Good 
coordination can help make possible actions such as cooperative efforts to scale up an effective 
program. It can also help avoid problems such as duplicate programs, confusion, and agency 
rivalries (as has been reported, for example, in Ontario’s innovation system). In the worst case 
scenario, innovation agencies and others can work at cross-purposes. In documenting the 
coordination of each IA, we should seek to understand the extent of cooperative ties maintained 
with other parts of the government (ministry of economy, ministry of education, and so forth) as 
well as the means by which that coordination is maintained. Are the agencies coordinated 
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through formal or legal frameworks or simply informal relationships between agency 
executives? 
Second, coordination with the private sector actors is also very important for IAs, but this 
involves a difficult balance between the agency being too responsive and not responsive enough 
to the private sector. There is a well-known concern with public agencies being “captured” by 
the private sector; in the case of capture, private sector actors have undue influence over the 
agency and policies are not deployed in manners that provide the broadest social good. At the 
same time, however, having close ties to industries and firms is important so conditions and 
problems facing the particular industries can be understood and suitable, well-tailored policies 
developed. This kind of coordination – or some other means of gathering specific, current 
information about industries – is necessary to raise the likelihood that the private sector responds 
in the right way to policy initiatives. The key to maintaining close enough contact but avoiding 
capture relies on the mechanisms for monitoring the economic “horizon” as well as assessment 
and accountability, which are outlined in other sections. 
 
III.C.4. Organization 
Organization in this context refers to human resources, assessment and learning, and other 
internal processes. In terms of human resources, the size and educational and professional 
background of staff members in IAs is linked to the effectiveness of the agency when using 
specific tools or pursing particular targets. For example, a vertically-oriented agency, need to 
have a much deeper and specific technological and technical knowledge, at the extreme even 
taking on much of the R&D in-house similarly to ITRI (Taiwan). In a horizontally-oriented 
agency, such skills can be acquired as needed to evaluate specific projects or programs, a good 
example is the Israeli OCS use of external project evaluators with technical abilities on part-time 
basis in order to ensure that bureaucrats without specific technical expertise are making the right 
granting decisions for proposed projects coming from private industry. IRAP in Canada recruits 
staff with some technical expertise, business experience, and a broad set of contacts, so that they 
are able to either assist businesses directly or locate an organization that can assist. Moreover, 
the means by which the agency retains critical staff through wages and promotion is central, in 
light of the need for skilled and knowledgeable personnel. In short, there is not a single model 
for how to recruit staff, as this will depend upon the goals and instruments used by the agency. 
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What is clear, however, is that successful IAs have found ways to recruit and retain human 
resources with high bureaucratic competency and technical expertise that fits with their missions, 
goals, and actual programs. 
 IAs need mechanisms for evaluation, learning, and accountability in order to ensure the 
success of their own instruments. Regarding evaluation, an experimentalist agency must have the 
capacity to assess whether their programs work as expected or not. And then, as discussed above, 
alterations must be made if evaluations of a program or of a firm’s participation are negative. 
The nature of these assessments will differ depending upon the type of program, but they must be 
in place. To give a single example, staffers in Canada’s IRAP have a high degree of discretion in 
their interactions with particular firms. They can determine how case work with a firm should 
continue, or if work with the firm should be terminated. Accountability for this discretion comes 
from an IRAP review committee, which examines case files to evaluate the decisions they made 
by staff.  
 There are a variety of indicators available for the documentation of staff skills and 
recruitment and for mechanisms for assessment and accountability. However, since IAs need to 
be co-evolutionary in nature, in many, if not most areas there is a need  to have a qualitative 
narratives and case studies of projects that are perceived as being very successful, as well as 
descriptions of evaluation mechanisms and accountability measures. If possible, narratives of 
programs that have been approved, assessed, and then cut for lack of success would be 
particularly helpful. Finally, because the perceived value of the agency is important for 
cooperation and influence, the nature of public perception of the agency – and the extent to 
which the agency attempts to shape that reputation – should be taken into account. 
 
III.C.5. Instruments 
“Instruments” refers to the particular policy interventions that an IA deploys in the interest of 
innovation and development. Beyond documenting the nature and reach of the instruments that 
they employ, there are two elements to be assessed: 1) whether those instruments are 
appropriately structured given the goals of the agency, and 2) whether they are effective tools or 
not. In the interest of both of these aims, we propose categorizing the portfolio of tools employed 
along two axes: instrument targets/goals and instrument means. Regarding an instrument’s goals, 
these are the element of the innovation ecosystem that the intervention is intended to affect. 
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These can vary from R&D promotion to human capital development to increasing trade. The 
instrumental means – or the manner in which the instrument intervenes – can be placed on the 
opposite axis. These can range from direct grants to networking/coordination. This approach 
allows each instrument to be plotted according to its combined means and ends. In addition to 
identifying the particular instruments an agency has employed, this allows for easier evaluation 
of the effectiveness of an instrument as well as identifying matches (or mismatches) between 
broad agency goals and the actual instruments they use. For example, an IA that expressing its 
goal as raising the levels of private R&D, but employs instruments that increase labor capacity 
through training and education can be identified as having misaligned mission and instruments. 
Table 1 describes the instrument targets and means of interest. 
Table 1: Instrument Targets and Means 
 
Instrument Target 
 
Description 
Knowledge (Creation 
and Transfer) 
Generate new technologies or facilitate the acquisition or adoption 
of existing technologies by domestic firms 
Labor (Human Capital 
Formation) 
Raise the level of labor capabilities through education, training or 
retraining, and similar programs targeting human capital.  
Research and 
Development (Firms) 
Increase the capacity of firms to conduct their own R&D activities 
in-house or to contract with outside organizations to conduct 
necessary research 
Entrepreneurship Develop a culture of entrepreneurship among potential and actual 
businesspeople with the goal of increasing firm formation and 
growth 
Innovation System Establish or strengthen organizations that are pieces of the national 
innovation systems, including research laboratories, universities, 
business support organizations, subnational government agencies 
New Sector 
Development 
Support the establishment or growth novel industrial sectors, 
ranging from promoting the import of new machines or techniques, 
or incubator space, computers, internet infrastructure that are 
necessary for small start-ups with novel products or services 
Trade Promotion Raise levels of trade – predominantly export – of particular goods by 
improving the productivity or improving access to information about 
foreign market conditions  
 
Instrument Means 
 
Description 
Grants Direct financial contributions to firms or organizations (generally 
non-repayable) 
Credit Financing Provision of credit or subsidized interest on credit 
Investment Direct investment in company shares, either with or without intent to 
control; venture capital  
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Information General provision of relevant information through regularized forms 
of communication to firms, innovation organizations 
Coordination/ 
Networking 
Active efforts to draw together firms, organizations, and/or agencies 
to promote contact, information sharing, and coordination among 
them 
 
 
Combining the means and targets of the individual instruments yields a table describing 35 
different combinations to which individual instruments used by IAs can be matched. For 
example, the instrument used most heavily by the Canadian IRAP are non-repayable grants to 
SMEs for the conduct on R&D on approved projects. To the same end, the agency also provides 
advisory services in which they help SMEs understand their technological barriers and link the 
enterprises to appropriate research labs or other organizations that can assist in addressing those 
barriers. 
 
  Instrument Targets 
  Knowledge 
creation / 
transfer 
Labor 
(HK 
formation)  
R&D and 
innovation 
for firms 
Entreprene-
urship   
Innovation 
systems 
New sector 
development 
Trade 
promotion   
In
st
ru
m
en
t M
ea
ns
 
Grants 
 
  IRAP – 
SME grant 
    
Credit 
financing 
       
Investment 
 
       
Information   
 
       
Coordination 
/ networking 
  IRAP – 
advisory 
service 
    
 
 
Given that IAs may employ any number of instruments (IRAP in Canada uses four 
permanent instruments, for example, while CORFO in Chile employs dozens), it is important to 
also consider the relative importance of each kind of instrument for the IA’s portfolio and the 
characteristics (number, size, sector) of the beneficiaries. Finally, the manner in which the 
instruments function – from agency outreach, to the selection of beneficiaries, to the timing of 
benefits, to the monitoring of the project outcomes – are important to understand, given that the 
manner in which the IA intervenes in the private sector is based upon available instruments. 
Finally, assessment obviously depends on the extent to which instruments actually do 
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create the outcome that they intend. What observable outcomes of each instrument are there? To 
follow on one of the examples above, IRAP provides business grants to SMEs to conduct R&D 
with the broader goal of increasing business growth. How much increased growth can be 
attributed to the funding? The outcomes in question will differ with regard to the goal, but 
insofar as it is possible, observable outcomes should be documented. 
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IV. Structure and Variables for Case Studies 
 In developing a set of variables for comparison, we assume the dual goals of being able 
1) to document the primary characteristics of innovation agencies in such a manner that they can 
be compared to one another, and 2) to assess the success of the IAs given their goals, their 
operational features, and their outcomes. Just as it makes little analytical sense to lump all IAs 
together as an undifferentiated group in terms of objectives, organization, and instruments, it is 
problematic to assess them against a single set of performance benchmarks. As such, we propose 
a framework that situates variables of interest into a set of guiding questions: What is the general 
purpose of the agency? What are its specific objectives within that purpose? How is the agency 
structured to address those goals? The purpose is to provide a systematic enough examination of 
the IAs that it could offer a guide or “playbook” for policymakers to assess their own IA and 
have some basis for progress. In Table 2, the general variables of concern - both in terms of IA 
characteristics and IA performance - are situated under the relevant guiding question; 
disaggregated elements of those characteristics (if necessary) are provided in the third column; 
quantitative and descriptive indicators (i.e., data to be collected) corresponding to each of these 
elements is listed in the final column.  
 Some of the data identified in the final column are quantitative measures, but we would 
stress the importance of qualitative or narrative indicators (such as the stated purpose of the 
agency, its development over time, background of agency staff, or modes of self-assessment). In 
addition, due to the dynamic and evolutionary goals of IAs, which means that much of their 
desired impact is behavioral changes of innovative agents, we strongly advise employing a 
narrative of “client cases” as part of the assessment tools, both for our study and for the IAs 
themselves. One of the basic mistakes of many IAs is relying only on quantitative measures, 
which then skew the incentives of the IA away from their main goal (dynamic, behavioral, and 
evolutionary change), to that of “hitting the mark” in a set of partial proxies such as patents, 
return on investment, or jobs created.  
 Because of the likelihood of changes in agency structure, mandate or environment over 
time - and the consequent difficulty of interpreting “snapshot” data in a meaningful way - we 
propose the gathering of data over the last 15 years. For quantitative data, this may mean figures 
for each of the last 15 years (if there is significant difference) for each of the indicators; for 
qualitative data, it may mean indicating whether there was a significant change over time or 
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developing a narrative around how or why changes occurred. It would also mean that every effort 
should be made to interview the people responsible at these agency (and hopefully some clients) 
during that period. 
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IV.B. Analytical Structure and Variables 
 
Based on the discussion above, Table 2 lays out the structure for the analysis of individual agencies below. Each numbered Guide 
Question is marked with a D for Documentation or A for Assessment (also shaded in the table) in order to distinguish between the 
dual goals of the analysis. Critically, because these agencies can (and should be expected to) change from year to year, in order to 
capture the evolutionary dynamics of the IA in question, data should be gathered for as much of the last 15 years as possible. 
 
 
Table 2: Analytical Structure and Variables 
 
 Guide Question Variables of 
Interest 
Disaggregated Elements Indicators 
0-D How would one 
characterize setting 
–the “national 
innovation system” 
and productive 
structure – of  the 
country? 
Domestic 
environment  
1. Structure of the Economy 
2. National Innovation System  
3. History of Industrial Policy 
  
1a. Sectoral shares;  
1b. High vs low tech goods 
1c. current and historical levels of productivity 
2a. Description: general NIS 
2b. Domestic GERD/BERD 
2c. Educational attainment 
3. Description: historical industrial policy 
International 
environment 
4.Trade regime 
5. International business 
4. Openness of trade; major partners 
5. FDI; size, presence of MNCs  
1-D What is the broad 
mission of the IA in 
its environment? 
Mission/Strategy 1. Transformative vs. 
Upgrading 
 
2. Vertical vs. Horizontal 
development  
 
3. Other   
1a. Strategy document and narrative of the 
development of the agency 
1b. To what extent is IA intended to support 
under-developed sectors vs. inertial support of 
existing ones? 
2a. Identify stated purpose of IA in strategy 
document / described by agency executives 
2b. Document sectoral distribution of 
funding/projects 
3. Identify other elements of mission 
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2-D What are the 
strategic goals of 
the IA? 
 1.Strategic Objectives 1. Identify the specific objectives of the IA 
 
3-A To what extent are the goals and design of the agency “externally suited” 
to the domestic NIS and to the global conditions? 
 
1. Describe how the IA with its mission/goals 
fits into economic environment? Does it address 
apparent gaps? Has mission evolved to address 
emerging needs? In what respects might 
mission seem inappropriate to setting? 
 
4-D What are the 
operational features 
of the IA? How 
does the agency 
pursue its broad 
mandate/mission?  
Organization Staff 
1. Size of staff 
2. Make-up of staff 
3. Training/Professionalism of 
staff 
4. Competitive wages 
5. Promotion / tenure  
1. Number of staff 
2. administration vs. field agents/other 
3a. background of staff / recruitment 
requirements; use of outside consultants with 
technical expertise 
3b. Biography of director, particularly 
background in industry 
4. Average wage, relative to comparable 
positions in public and private sectors 
5. Potential for promotion average job tenure 
Learning 
6. Self-monitoring 
Mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6a. Qualitative description of three most 
successful cases of innovation 
6b. Description of regularized means of agency 
self-assessment / learning  
6c. Describe other agency perceptions of 
agency; to what extent is it influential and 
prestigious among bureaucrats  
6d. describe private sector perceptions of 
agency; to what extent do private sector actors 
respect agency and follow its lead? 
6e. Description of cases in which does agency 
cut failed programs 
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5-D  Governance  Within public sector: 
1. Bureaucratic autonomy and 
oversight 
2. Veto Power 
3. Insulation from political 
pressures in management 
1a. Description of governance structure of 
agency (on paper and in practice) 
1b. Describe degree of autonomy 
2. Is veto power/direction exercised by 
overseeing minister/ministry or other official? 
(de facto, not just de jure) 
3. Describe whether political influence in 
exercised and how 
Relative to Private sector 4. Describe general relationship/points of 
contract with private industry 
5. Describe mechanisms for private sector to 
influence decisions 
6. What mechanisms are available for 
monitoring economic “horizon” or private 
sector technology development/use 
6-D  Financing Budget Level: 
1. Amount of funding 
2. Stability/Predictabilty 
 
 
 
1. Size of budget relative to economy; 
Description of use of budget (i.e. balance b/w 
too little to be effective and too much to be 
cooperative) 
2. Identify fluctuations in funding; threats to 
continued funding 
Financing Mechanism: 
3. Source of funding;  
4. Autonomy of funding 
3. Nature of budget line (i.e. freestanding/part 
of larger agency) 
4. Identify if protected/dedicated budget line or 
subject to political manipulation  
 28 
7-D  Coordination 1. Relationship with other 
agencies in public sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Coordination with private 
sector 
1a. Number/type of agencies with working 
relationships with agency 
1b. Description of relationships of relationships 
with other institutions 
1c. descriptions of informal partnerships/formal 
coordination with other agencies; 
1d. Divided STI and Innovation/Entrep. 
agencies? 
 
2a. Describe formal mechanisms for 
coordination with industry (collaborative 
projects, participation on committees, business 
group consultation, etc.) 
2b. Characterize informal coordination with 
private sector. 
8-D  Instruments:  What instruments does the IA 
employ?  
 
 
1. Identify each instrument by target and means 
(on instrument portfolio table). 
2. Overall portion of budget to each instrument 
3. Beneficiaries of instruments (generally firms) 
by number, size, amount of benefit 
How does each instrument 
work? 
 
4. Describe how is instrument promoted 
/outreach 
5. Describe how potential beneficiaries are 
screened / selected 
6. Describe mechanism by which individual 
projects monitored and available recourse for 
underperformance? Describe cases of cut-off, if 
available 
7. Describe how overall effectiveness of 
instrument is monitored 
8. Describe timing structure for finance 
instruments: how quickly is instrument 
available, how long-lasting? 
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9. How long has the program been active and 
has it changed in character over time?  
 
Observable outcomes 10. Identify outcomes: changes to sectoral 
makeup of economy, employment (type or 
amount), amounts or value-added to exports, to 
location of firms in global value chains, growth, 
conduct of R&D, or whatever  based on the 
objectives of the agency 
9-A To what extent are the operational features and the broad mission “internal 
coherent”? 
1. Describe the extent to which the features fit 
together to promote the mission of the agency? 
What elements appear to be out of sync with 
each other or with the broader mission? Has this 
shifted with time?  
10-
A 
Do the instruments and features of the agency work (vis-à-vis their own 
goals and external measures)? 
1. What do aggregate measures of IA impact 
indicate about the impact of the agency? These 
will vary, but potential measures: changes to 
R&D expenditure (funding levels, and describe 
nature of expenditure); Scaling up of small 
firms; Number/success rate of startups; Levels 
and make-up of employment; kinds of jobs 
available; etc.  
2. Describe other agency perceptions of agency; 
to what extent is it influential and prestigious 
among bureaucrats 
3. describe private sector perceptions of agency; 
to what extent do private sector actors respect 
agency and follow its lead? 
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